Avec la démission en 2008 de Suzanne Folsom, directrice de l’unité anti-fraude de la Banque Mondiale, le monde entier avait déjà pu s’apercevoir que l'organisation ne prenait pas le phénomène de la corruption au sérieux et que nombreux étaient les collaborateurs “allergiques” à tout effort visant à poursuivre les cas de fraude:
(...) many in the bank remained “allergic” to efforts to prosecute cases of fraud. Another official said that ties between Ms. Folsom and the bank had been on a “downward spiral” in recent months.
Associates of Ms. Folsom said she had decided to leave her job because she had accomplished the goal of making the battle against corruption a major priority, but realized that opposition to her work by others had made it difficult for her to go on.
Comme si cela ne suffisait pas, la Banque Mondiale reçoit aujourd'hui un zéro pointé officiel concernant ses procédures de détection des fraudes dans ses programmes d’aide aux pays pauvres:
The World Bank's fraud-detection procedures in its main aid program to poor countries were labeled a "material weakness" in an internal report, adding to the bank's woes in handling corruption issues.
The bank's Independent Evaluation Group gave it the lowest possible rating for fraud-detection procedures in the $40 billion aid program, called the International Development Association. That could hurt contributions to the effort, which gives grants and interest-free loans to the world's 78 poorest countries. (...)
The World Bank has been pilloried by critics for years for not taking corruption seriously enough, and some staffers worried that the report's publication was being delayed for political reasons. The U.S., in particular, pushed for its publication, said bank staffers.